The Presidential Reference concerning the powers of the Governors and the President in relation to state bills reached the Supreme Court through the exercise of the President’s advisory jurisdiction under Article 143 of the Constitution.
The Reference was primarily triggered by a specific judicial decision. The Tamil Nadu Government challenged the Governor’s prolonged delay in giving assent to several bills passed by the State legislature.
The Supreme Court, on April 8, 2025, delivered a judgment in which a two-judge Bench found the Governor’s indefinite delay to be “illegal” and “erroneous.” The Apex Court, using its inherent power under Article 142, set specific timelines for Governors and the President to act on state bills presented for assent under Articles 200 and 201, and even went to the extent of suggesting ‘deeming assent’ on some long-pending bills.
The Supreme Court’s ruling, particularly the imposition of fixed timelines and the concept of ‘deemed assent,’ created significant constitutional uncertainty regarding the scope of the Governor’s and President’s powers.
The two-judge Bench prescribed a maximum of three months for the Governor to either withhold assent and return a Bill with a message or reserve it for the President’s consideration, and a maximum of one month for the Governor to grant assent to a Bill re-enacted by the State Legislature.
The President was required to decide on Bills reserved for her consideration by the Governor within three months from the date of reference.
Consequently, President Droupadi Murmu invoked her power under Article 143(1) of the Constitution to seek the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion on the matter.
The President referred a set of 14 questions to the Supreme Court, seeking clarity on whether the judiciary can fix timelines for them or review the merits of their decisions.
The Supreme Court constituted a five-judge Constitution Bench (as required by Article 145(3) for Article 143 references) to hear the matter. The opinion, delivered on November 20, 2025, by a bench comprising Chief Justice BR Gavai, Chief Justice-Designate Surya Kant, and Justices Vikram Nath, PS Narasimha, and AS Chandurkar, was unanimous and referred to as the “Opinion of the Court.”
The opinion essentially clarified the constitutional position, holding that while Governors cannot sit on bills indefinitely, the Court cannot impose fixed timelines or grant “deemed assent,” as this would violate the separation of powers.
This decision significantly enhanced the constitutional power and authority of both the Governor and the President by firmly establishing two key principles: the rejection of fixed judicial timelines and “deemed assent,” and the affirmation of the Governor’s and President’s non-justiciable constitutional discretion.
While rejecting the safeguards sought by the opposition-ruled States, the Supreme Court issued a very strong constitutional caution to Governors, limiting their power through the threat of judicial review of inaction.
The most significant caution is against the practice of sitting on a Bill indefinitely. The Constitution Bench expressed its view that a Governor cannot use silence or deliberate, prolonged inaction as a method to obstruct the legislative will of the State Assembly.
The Apex Court stressed that stalling bills indefinitely and bringing bills to a procedural impasse is antithetical to the Constitution and that the system of cooperative federalism demands dialogue and cooperation, not obstructionism. It said the Governor must choose one of the options expressly provided by Article 200 (Assent, Reserve, or Return) and clarified that the Governor does not have the option to “withhold assent simpliciter.” If assent is withheld, the Governor must simultaneously return the Bill to the State Legislature for reconsideration with a message outlining their concerns. This compels constitutional dialogue.
While the Court cannot review the merits of the Governor’s decision, it can review the fact of deliberate inaction. It clarified that “inaction that is prolonged, unexplained, and indefinite” will “certainly invite limited judicial scrutiny.” If found, the Supreme Court can intervene to issue a limited writ of mandamus, directing the Governor to exercise one of the three constitutional options within a reasonable period, without dictating which one to choose. The immunity under Article 361 cannot shield indefinite delays.
In essence, the Supreme Court’s opinion drew a clear red line: Governors have discretion on what to do with a Bill (Assent, Reserve, or Return), but they have no constitutional discretion on when to do it if the delay is clearly a willful attempt to obstruct the elected Government.
Despite the caution mentioned above, does the Supreme Court’s opinion have a demoralising impact on Opposition-Ruled States and undermine the People’s Choice for governance of the State through elected Government? Will this help in reducing the conflict between Governors and the Opposition-Ruled States?
The enhancement of the Governor’s power is widely seen as demoralising for opposition-ruled states, where there has been enormous conflict in the exercise of power by both the Government and the Governors.
Without a fixed deadline, Governors- often perceived as acting on behalf of the central Government — can continue to engage in prolonged, indefinite delay, making it politically and legally challenging for state Governments to get their legislation passed quickly.
Further, this enhanced power, despite the cautions, is perceived by the states as undermining the people’s choice and their legislative mandate.
The ruling essentially chose to uphold the Constitution’s system of checks and balances (the Governor’s power to scrutinize bills) rather than ensuring the quick and easy passage of laws desired by the elected state Government.
The Supreme Court’s cautions, like limited judicial review of prolonged delay, are subjective and lack a measurable standard. This means states must still engage in lengthy, expensive legal battles to force a Governor to act, thereby stalling bills meant for the people and frustrating the will of the elected Assembly. It places the burden of fighting gubernatorial obstruction back on the shoulders of the elected state Governments, which is precisely why it is viewed as demoralising.
The Supreme Court’s opinion won’t stop Governors and opposition-ruled states from fighting, but it does give them rules for how to fight based on the Constitution. Since no deadline, like 60 or 90 days, has been fixed for Governors to act, the process of Bills has been left open-ended. A Governor who intends to obstruct can still cause long delays by offering vague reasons, moving the bill slowly, or engaging in a drawn-out “dialogue.”
Some of the lawyers who closely watched the proceedings in the Presidential Reference explained that the opinion has not talked about the deadline for the Governor’s action on the Bills, as the five-judge Constitution Bench adhered strictly to the principle of separation of powers.
They said the Court’s role in an advisory opinion under Article 143 is to interpret the existing law, not to amend the Constitution. By refusing to impose fixed timelines, the Court signaled that imposing such a procedural rule would be an act of “judicial amendment,” which is the exclusive domain of Parliament under Article 368. Therefore, the opinion deliberately offered a judicial remedy (limited review of inaction) instead of a legislative remedy (a constitutional amendment).
In such circumstances, since state Governments are established through the people’s choice, Governors are expected to act on Bills quickly and decisively to implement the legislative mandate. The expectation is that the Governor should not use silence or deliberate, prolonged inaction to obstruct the legislative will of the State Assembly.
As the opinion in the Presidential Reference has severely diluted the extreme view taken in the judgment by the two-judge Bench (specifically the fixed timelines and ‘deemed assent’), the onus is now firmly placed on the Governors, particularly in opposition-ruled states, to consider every Bill judiciously and within a reasonable time.
Further, the political stakes of this judicial clarification are especially high in opposition-ruled states like West Bengal, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, all of which are scheduled to go for assembly elections in 2026.
Given the persistent tension between the Governors and the elected State Governments in these states, the Supreme Court’s opinion ensures that Governors are now constitutionally compelled to take a definitive, reviewable action (Assent, Reserve, or Return the Bill with a message), thereby ensuring that the Governor’s decision will become a more transparent subject for political debate before the elections.
